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INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
LAN CAO*
In recent years, the call for strong and clear property rights has
grown in law and development circles. In the landmark book The
Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails
Everywhere Else,1 de Soto put forth the claim that “strong and clear”
property rights, formalized rather than informal, are necessary for
economic efficiency and for the protection of the poor, who occupy
through squatting, for example, property that they do not own. De
Soto believes that for capitalism to work in poor countries, as it does
in the West, poor countries must establish a system in which indi-
vidual property rights are protected and formally titled. A formal
land title system empowers the poor by assuring them rights to prop-
erty critical to economic self-sufficiency. De Soto and the Institute for
Liberty and Democracy, which he founded, pushed for reforms to mod-
ernize Peru’s laws and regulations, transferring land titles to more
than a million Peruvian families who had previously subsisted in an
informal land system that gave them no rights over property they
worked or occupied. “Until you have universal, well-protected, clear,
and transferable private property rights, you cannot have a market
economy in Peru, in the ghetto, or anywhere else. And you are going
to have all the problems those places have,” de Soto remarked.2
According to de Soto, unreported, unrecorded economic activity in
the informal sector creates a titling void for the poor because they
are deprived of access to a formal system that gives them legal own-
ership of their property. Without legal title, the poor struggle to get
credit and engage in economic transactions. Because they lack legal
ownership, legal remedies are also beyond their reach should land
disputes arise. When the poor are trapped in the informal, extrale-
gal sector, they are excluded from the formal, legal sector and from
* Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I thank Prof. Lynda Butler of William
and Mary Law School and Vice Dean Weixing Shen of Tsinghua University Law School for
inviting me to be a panelist at the 2011 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference.
1. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2003).
2. Frank Pellegrini, The Modern Hernando de Soto, METRO CHI. REAL EST. MAG., Dec. 2006,
at 43, available at http://www.prairietitle.com/pdf/TitleTalk/TitleTalk1206.pdf.
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gaining access to the benefits of law and globalization—their assets,
adding up to more than $10 trillion USD worldwide, as estimated by
de Soto, languish as dead capital.3
De Soto’s efforts have been widely praised. Bill Clinton, for exam-
ple, called him “The world’s greatest living economist.”4 Secretary
General Kofi Annan of the United Nations said, “Hernando is ab-
solutely right, that we need to rethink how we capture economic
growth and development.”5 But de Soto’s ideas have also been cri-
tiqued by many scholars and activists. His property rights initiative
has generated strong backlash from non-governmental organiza-
tions and social movements because they believe that his policy pre-
scriptions may be inappropriate for the poorest of the poor. According
to these scholars and activists, incorporating the poor conspicuously
into the formal economy, without more, will simply enfold them into
an onerous tax base that might be counterproductive for those living
on the edge.6 Others charge that titling creates incentives for indi-
vidual struggles to get titles and could erode the much-needed soli-
darity that the poor must forge to progress economically.7 Critics
also charge that de Soto oversimplifies the informal economy and its
property relations. For example, according to these critics, it is un-
clear how de Soto would want the legal system to be adjusted to ac-
commodate other parallel systems and “the unsettling implications
for mainstream property systems, are skirted, not confronted.”8
De Soto’s main point boils down to “converting informal property
into private property through systematic titling”9 in order to ensure
3. DE SOTO, supra note 1, at 301–31.
4. Press Release, U.N.C. at Chapel Hill, Noted Economist de Soto to Discuss Property
Rights as Solution to Global Poverty in Oct. 26 Address (Oct. 19, 2004), http://www.unc.edu
/news/archives/oct04/fpg_desoto101904.html.
5. Press Release, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Press Conference at International Labour
Organization (Jul. 16, 2001), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sgsm7892.doc.htm.
6. Ben Cousins et al., Will Formalising Property Rights Reduce Poverty in South Africa’s
‘Second Economy’? Questioning the Mythologies of Hernando de Soto, PLAAS POL’Y BRIEF, Oct.
2005, at 1, available at http://www.icarrd.org/en/proposals/Policy2018.pdf; see also MIKE DAVIS,
PLANET OF SLUMS 80 (2006) (arguing that formal titling may help some by incorporating them
into the economic system, it is a double edged sword but for tenants who are unable to pay the
taxes that follow titling).
7. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 80–81.
8. Cousins et al., supra note 6, at 2.
9. Id.
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a system of strong and clear property rights.10 As observers have
noted, de Soto’s primary argument is that “clearly defined property
rights generate what economists call positive externalities, or bene-
fits shared by everyone.”11 This claim, however, has been incisively
critiqued by Professor David Kennedy, who argued that “[t]he case for
a straightforward link between ‘clear and strong’ property rights and
robust growth or development in today’s industrial societies is more
ideological assertion than careful history.”12 According to Professor
Kennedy, the developed economies of the modern West “have experi-
enced periods of aggressive industrialization and economic growth
with a wide range of different property regimes in place.”13 De Soto’s
notion of clear and strong property rights rests on the mistaken
assumption that “‘property rights’ have an ideal form—capable of
being clarified and strengthened—which can be disentangled from
the warp and woof of social and economic struggle in a society.”14
This paper will expand on one of the points Professor Kennedy
espouses, specifically positioning property rights against a “complex
system of forces” that include not just the “legal fabric” but also “the
informal world of custom and business practice which transform the
meaning of entitlements for different actors.”15 Professor Kennedy
stated that
[t]he focus on strong and clear rights . . . obscures the fact that
no property law regime is composed solely of rights, however
strong or clear. There are always also lots of reciprocal obliga-
tions, duties and legal privileges to injure. Property law is a com-
plex system of forces pulling in contradictory directions. As such,
it offers myriad opportunities for fine-tuning the relationship
10. De Soto is not the only one who has made this claim, although he has been most
identified perhaps with this principle. Scholars in the field of New Institutional Economics
have made similar arguments. The World Bank too asserts that secure and well-defined land
rights are key to growth and development.
11. Robert J. Samuelson, The Spirit of Capitalism, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2001, at
207, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/56674/robert-j-samuelson/the-spirit
-of-capitalism.
12. David Kennedy, Some Caution About Property Rights as a Recipe for Economic
Development, 1 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1, 3 (2011), available at http://www.bepress.com/ael/vol1
/iss1/3.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 8.
15. Id. at 6.
266 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 1:263
among economic and social interests in pursuit of a develop-
ment strategy.16
In other words, an emphasis on strength and clarity “has tended
to take the focus off the sorts of social, cultural, institutional and
political transformations generally associated with ‘development.’”17
Indeed, simply making property rights strong and clear does not
begin to address a host of thorny issues that implicate distribu-
tional considerations or rights and obligations that are associated
with a country’s historical or cultural fabric. Thus, the call for strong
and clear property rights cannot sidestep allocative determinations,
whether those determinations are made as a matter of explicit pub-
lic policy or implicit cultural norms.18
Because property is a “bundle of rights”19 which are themselves
embedded in institutional regimes, it is important to place property
rights against an institutional framework. In this respect, Douglas
North’s observation that institutions are “rules of the game” or
“humanly-devised constraints that shape human interaction”20 is
especially relevant. For North, constraints include both what are
prohibited and what are permitted, providing the “incentive frame-
work” that guides human behavior.21 And institutions can be formal
or informal,22 consisting of both “formal written rules as well as
16. Id. at 4.
17. Id. at 29.
18. One reason the “strong and clear property rights” idea continues to seem
innocent of any allocative public policy commitment is the lay notion that
property rights concern the relationship between an individual and “his
property.” Strengthening and clarifying that relationship does not seem to
implicate anyone else. It seems merely to empower him to participate more
effectively in the economy. For a legal professional, however, property is not
about the relationship between persons and things. Rather it concerns the
relationship between people with respect to a thing.
Id. at 26.
19. James Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711–
820 (1996).
20. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 3 (1990).
21. Indra de Soysa & Johannes Jütting, Informal Institutions and Development: Think
Local, Act Global?, OECD DEV. CENTRE & DEV. ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE—NETWORK ON
GOVERNANCE 3 (Dec. 11–12, 2006), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/16/37790393.pdf.
22. Id. at 2; see also Hans-Joachim Lauth, Informal Institutions and Democracy, 7
DEMOCRATIZATION 21 (Winter 2000); Guillermo O’Donnell, Another Institutionalization: Latin
America and Elsewhere 10 (Kellogg Inst. for Int’l Stud., Working Paper No. 222, 1996),
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typically unwritten codes of conduct and regularized behavior that
underlie and supplement formal rules.”23 The former are enforced
by formal entities such as courts, judges, police, and other officials,
whereas the latter are “largely self-enforcing through mechanisms
of obligation, such as in patron-client relationships or clan networks,
or simply because following the rules is in the best interests of in-
dividuals who may find themselves in a ‘Nash equilibrium’ where
everyone is better off from cooperation.”24 Although “all informal in-
stitutions (rules governing behavior outside official channels) should
not be confused with culture,”25 there is nevertheless “a close associ-
ation between . . . the ‘constitutive’ and ‘regulatory’ effects of culture
and informal institutions.”26 Informal institutions then are reflected
in and encompass a cultural regime. Thus, culture is part of the
institutional regime that North discusses. In other words, the con-
stitutive dimensions of informal institutions
relate to aspects of culture that shape economic behavior by guid-
ing relative valuation, categorizations and understandings of eco-
nomic processes and outcomes, which are passed on through the
generations of parents, schools, peers. The regulatory effects refer
to the way in which the values and beliefs of a society are mani-
fested through social norms and attitudes in ways that regulate
behavior: promises must be kept, contracts must be honored.27
As de Soysa and Jütting observed, Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom
calls such informal rules “rules in force” to reflect the notion that al-
though they are generally not codified they are deemed legitimate
available at http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/222.pdf. One way of dis-
tinguishing an informal from formal institution is by reference to the state-societal dichotomy.
“Formal institution” refers to state bodies such as courts, legislatures and bureaucracies or
state-enforced rules such as constitutions, laws, regulations, court decisions. “Informal in-
stitution” refers to “civic, religious, kinship, and other ‘societal’ rules and organizations.”
Gretchen Helmke & Steven Levitsky, Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A
Research Agenda 8 (Kellogg Inst. for Int’l Stud. Working Paper No. 307, 2003), available at
http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/307.pdf. However, this approach fails
to take into account informal rules within state institutions or official rules within non-state
organizations (rules of religious orders or political parties). Helmke & Levitsky, supra, at 8.
23. De Soysa & Jütting, supra note 21, at 3.
24. De Soysa & Jütting, supra note 21, at 3.
25. Id. at 2.
26. Id.
27. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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and hence “rules in operation.”28 They are, in other words, “socially
sanctioned norms of behavior (attitudes, customs, taboos, conventions,
and traditions).”29 By contrast, formal rules and constraints that are
part of formal institutions are “constitutions, laws, property rights,
charters, bylaws, statute[s] and common law, and regulations.”30
Property rights are embedded in an existing institutional regime,
which includes formal institutions as well as informal institutions
such as culture. Thus, property rights are themselves a reflection of
formal institutions as well as informal institutions. Law and devel-
opment objectives such as the call for “strong and clear” property
rights—without more—seemingly address only one component of the
overall framework—formal institutions—while ignoring the other
equally important component—informal institutions, such as cul-
ture. Rights, including property rights, are embedded in a cultural
regime. Certainly property can be an instrumental component for
development strategy, but simply asserting that having clear prop-
erty rights is a baseline sidesteps other important considerations.
Such considerations include, for example, who will be entitled to have
property rights, what kind of property rights will be protected—even
if the rights, however defined, are defined clearly and strongly. In
other words, just because a property right is clear doesn’t answer at
all the question of who can be a right holder or what kinds of rights
will be entitled to legal protection. To understand all these other is-
sues requires understanding the relationship between the formal
and informal institutions, between property rights and the back-
ground cultural norms that animate those rights.
The purpose of this paper is to examine precisely this relationship.
The presence or absence of property rights must be examined against
the backdrop of culture. “Property rights are not the be all and end
all of progress but a simple reflection of the larger culture.”31 As I
discuss in the section below, it is important, especially in law and
development, to realize that formal institutions such as property
rights are affected by informal institutions.32 Law and development
28. De Soysa & Jütting, supra note 21, at 3.
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Samuelson, supra note 11, at 211.
32. Since the effectiveness of formal rules, such as penal codes, the rule of law and
democratic governance, depend on informal institutions, such as norms and
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has historically focused only on formal institutions and thus it should
not be any surprise that “not everyone finds strong effects from for-
mal institutions, such as the rule of law to development outcomes.”33
In other words, law and development as a field has been charac-
terized by failures which scholars and practitioners within the field
themselves bemoan and acknowledge. An almost exclusive emphasis
on formal institutions, I argue, has resulted in the field’s systematic
exclusion of culture from its lens. Yet,
changing formal (macro- and micro-level) institutions that might
be compatible with particular structural forms might yet not
fit very well with informal institutions given underlying cultur-
al factors that remain resistant to change, factors that have a
more proximate bearing on the outcomes we are interested in,
such as corruption, education, governance, or questions of gen-
der equality.34
So assuming that law and development efforts wish to establish
property rights in order to attract foreign investment, ensuring that
they are strong and clear does not address the important question
of the cultural framework in which the newly established property
rights are to operate. One needs to turn to background cultural norms
to more fully examine the issue. Thus, “the question of institutions
and development may depend greatly on how informal institutions
moderate formal ones as they affect outcomes.”35 It is important to
understand whether or not property rights introduced by law and
development projects are in sync with local culture or not. This issue
would seem to be as important as whether or not these rights are
“strong and clear.” More discussion on this issue will follow in the
section below.
attitudes and existing levels of social capital, or the patterns of interaction that
individuals assume in any shared activity, understanding where informal in-
stitutions come from and how they change is crucial to understanding how the
interaction between formal and informal institutions can be harnessed to effect
desirable policy goals.
De Soysa & Jütting, supra note 21, at 5.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 5.
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I. FORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS:
PROPERTY AND CULTURE
The development of a law of property is certainly important for a
law and development agenda. But “[b]efore ‘property rights’ can be
strong or weak, they must be allocated.”36 And how they are allo-
cated by law in the formal rule of law regime will depend on political
considerations and informal institutions such as culture.37 Property
rights “are embedded in a larger complex of legal rules, institutions
and procedures which alter the meaning of entitlements, and in a
dense fabric of social expectations and informal arrangements which
affect the meaning and usefulness of entitlements.”38 The question
that law and development is preoccupied with—introducing prop-
erty rights—is itself dependent on how informal institutions modify
formal ones.39
Numerous studies have reinforced what Douglass North termed
“rules of the game” and the extent to which behavioral guides could be
found in informal constraints. These studies generated calls, from
scholars such as Guillermo O’Donnell, for greater attention to infor-
mal institutions and to “the actual rules that are being followed.”40
The phrase “informal institutions” has had varied uses.41 There is
disagreement as to whether informal institutions should be distin-
guished from culture.42 But for the purpose of this paper, I adopt a
broad understanding of the phrase so that it can purposefully en-
compass culture. Informal institutions can be understood as a set
of informal, socially shared rules and norms that structure social
36. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 10.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. North observed that actors respond to a mix of “formal and informal constraints.”
NORTH, supra note 20, at 67.
40. O’Donnell, supra note 22, at 10 n.2. For example, an emerging body of research
suggests that informal rules do in fact influence formal institutional outcomes in a variety
of settings. In some African and Latin American countries, patrimonialist norms of unregu-
lated executive control over state institutions have resulted in executive power assertions
over legislative and judicial branches in ways unanticipated by the constitution. Guillermo
O’Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 55 (Jan. 1994).
41. The phrase “informal institution” may refer to aspects of traditional culture, personal
networks, clientelism, corruption, clan and mafia organizations, civil society, and a wide va-
riety of norms. Helmke & Levitsky, supra note 22, at 7–8.
42. Id. at 10.
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interaction by shaping and constraining actors’ behavior.43 Indeed,
in the context of developing countries especially, where the rule of
law is weak and informal rules may be relatively strong,44 it is im-
portant to understand how culture affects, modifies or tempers the
establishment of rights, such as property rights. This is especially
important because once established and allocated, “it is not always
easy to remake entitlement regimes. The existence of settled expec-
tations about the meaning and significance of legal entitlements can
also slow both economic and political change. . . . [T]hose with en-
titlements from round one will often be able to exercise political,
economic or legal influence in round two, making it more difficult to
begin again.”45 Professor Kennedy was referring more specifically
to those “[l]arge economic actors in every economy [who] seek to
use their entitlements to consolidate their political and economic
position.”46 But the same can be said of actors who rely on and lever-
age existing informal institutions—cultural norms, for example—
to resist reallocations of resources through the recognition of new
property rights or the reconfiguration of entitlements.
In many cases, it is undoubtedly true that cultural norms such as
clan or ethnic solidarity or community-based trust facilitate eco-
nomic transactions by solving various coordination problems and
thus reduce transaction costs.47 But certain cultural norms can also
have a negative impact. Many “studies highlight phenomena—such
as clientelism, corruption, patrimonialism, and clan politics—that
undermine the performance of markets, states, democratic regimes,
43. NORTH, supra note 20, at 3–4 n.9.
44. De Soysa & Jütting, supra note 21, at 8 (“People in both rich and poor countries rely
on informal institutions to varying degrees to facilitate transactions, but these institutions are
relatively more important in poor countries and small, traditional communities where formal
institutions are less developed and the reach of formal law and state power relatively weak.”).
45. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 11–12.
46. Id.
What is clear is that the arrangement of entitlements is not only the result of
political and social struggle, it also provides the stakes and instruments for that
struggle. The allocation of entitlements in each round establishes actors with
interests and procedures from their pursuit which have an impact on the
evolution of the society in successive rounds of political and economic devel-
opment. As a result, a regime of entitlements helps structure the next round of
social struggle.
Id.
47. Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 1095
(1986); Lan Cao, The Diaspora of Ethnic Economies: Beyond the Pale, 44 WM & MARY L. REV.
1521 (2003); Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841 (1999).
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and other formal institutions,”48 the very institutions that law and
development work to establish.
Take the example of family law. Assume that private property
rights that meet the criteria called for—“strong and clear”—are es-
tablished in a given society. Whether the formal institution of such
property rights grants entitlements to the family, to the head of the
household, or to women and men, it is highly likely that this formal
arrangement will be heavily affected by the cultural framework of
that society.49 This cultural framework transcends the standard
paradigm that has conventionally presented the issue as a “choice
between private property rights and state control, . . . [or] a choice
between public and private ownership”50 and rather, reflects “a
dense network of entitlements reflecting specific social histories of
allocative struggle.”51
There will be, in other words, the pull and tug, between formal
and informal institutions. Cultural norms may interact with formal
institutions in four ways—complementary, accommodating, compet-
ing and substituting.52 In some instances, cultural norms may coexist
with and are complementary to or accommodate effective formal
institutions.53 Or they may converge with or operate in lieu of state
law.54 But often, in developing countries where law and develop-
ment projects operate, competing cultural norms create incentives
and exert pressure on actors in ways that may be incompatible with
the objectives of law and development. For example, civil servants
in Ghana’s public administration believe they would lose their
social standing in the community if they adhered to administra-
tive rules rather than kinship norms that obligated them to provide
jobs to family and clan members.55 In the past, the introduction of
48. Helmke & Levitsky, supra note 22, at 11.
49. For example, when implementing land reform, “ought title to be given to the ‘head of
the household,’ to ‘the family,’ to the ‘matriarch,’ or to the community in common?” Kennedy,
supra note 12, at 47.
50. Id. at 16.
51. Id.
52. Helmke & Levitsky, supra note 22, at 12.
53. Id. at 12–13.
54. For examples, see id. at 14–16 (“[C]omplementary and accommodating informal
institutions exist in stable institutional settings, which are generally found in advanced
industrialized countries . . . and substitutive and competing informal institutions exist in
context of formal institutional weakness and instability, which are more likely found in
developing and post-communist countries.”).
55. See, e.g., id. at 12–13.
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European legal systems to the colonies created “multiple systems of
legal obligation.”56 Because local and European systems each “em-
bodied different principles and procedures,”57 adherence to one often
meant violating the other. Thus, it is not sufficient to issue a single-
bullet prescription without fully understanding how a prescription
to alter formal institutions will affect or be affected by existing in-
formal institutions.
The increasingly loud call in law and development for clear and
strong property rights, through formal titling programs, for exam-
ple, has had mixed results in Cape Town, South Africa. Clear and
strong property rights were instituted for households occupying va-
cant land owned by a parastatal company in the manner exhorted
by de Soto. A housing project was implemented and individual own-
ership was granted. Title was registered in the name of only one
member of each household, resulting, not surprisingly, not only in
“a decrease in security of tenure,” but also “reduced security for
women and members of the extended family.”58
Similar examples abound. In the Ekuthuleni region in South
Africa, residents of a rural community consisting of 224 households,
mostly headed by elderly women, live on state-registered land. These
residents, many of whom receive welfare, wish to formally acquire
title to the land and hold it in collective ownership primarily for
two reasons. The first is because the group wishes to retain “group
control . . . to prevent strangers from coming in and causing con-
flicts,” and the second is because members “cannot afford the costs
of maintaining individual title.”59 However, a system that focuses
only on establishing strong and clear property rights misses the fact
that informal institutions such as cultural norms may in fact com-
pete with formal property norms. The property rights system, for ex-
ample, requires that certain conditions must be met before rights
over property can be registered: “an individual rights holder must
be identified; the exclusive rights of this rights holder must be pre-
cisely described; and the boundaries of land parcels must be accu-
rately depicted through beaconing and geo-referencing.”60 But in
56. Id. at 14.
57. Id.
58. Cousins et al., supra note 6, at 3.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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this particular region, property ownership is rarely exclusively in-
dividual and is often shared by family members.
This is a concept that is clearly in competition with South African
property law. Even a family trust does not fully capture the cultural
dynamics that animate the informal norms of the region. “There are
many nuanced layers of rights in Ekuthuleni (of access, use, transac-
tions and decision-making) and it would be extremely difficult to pre-
cisely describe these in title deeds.”61 Indeed, it may very well be that
formal titling and strong and clear property rights do not benefit the
poorest of the poor.62 Informality means flexibility and flexibility
may benefit the most vulnerable63 because, for example, boundaries
are ever adaptable to reflect social needs or household emergencies.
Informality and flexibility may be important, as transactions involv-
ing land and housing in the informal sector in Cape Town are so-
cially embedded and social relations are an important component of
land tenure,64 reflecting the layered and relative nature of rights and
duties. Thus, there may be a “fundamental incompatibility between
property rights in community-based systems and the requirements
of formal property. Formalization of property rights is therefore not
neutral with respect to existing rights; it does and will transform
and alter both the nature of the rights and the social relations and
identities that underlie them.”65 Studies concerning land use in
rural South Africa show that “rights to land and natural resources
61. Id.
62. Some have suggested that clear and strong property rights through formalization does
not necessarily yield the benefits claimed. For example, it has not been the case in rural South
Africa that formal property rights promote lending to the poor. Banks still do not lend to the
poor because of the high risk of default, the low value of their assets and the high transaction
costs. Indeed, “formalization could expose the poor to the risk of homelessness: If banks could
be persuaded to lend to the poor with their assets as collateral, foreclosure of loans would
result in repossession.” Id. at 4. The poor who need to borrow may do so instead from micro-
finance institutions or other informal sources.
63. In many instances, homeowners were “not interested in a formal sale because their
incomes were too low to move up the housing ladder, and most viewed their homes as a family
asset rather than as ‘capital.’” Id. Moreover, a study of township property showed that there
was a weak secondary market for houses. Hence, emphasizing title deeds here is inappro-
priate, given the “real constraints of affordability and the limited availability of housing
stock.” Id.
64. “Property systems are embedded in many institutional arrangements, not only in
registers. Registers are thus only one component of the formal system, and it is the system
as a whole that makes property ‘visible’, manageable and exchangeable in the eyes of public
and private investors and service providers.” Id. at 3.
65. Id.
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are socially and culturally embedded, and nested within social and
political units operating at different scales.”
The South Africa example suggests that formalization and low-
cost mechanisms for titling may be appropriate, from a law and de-
velopment perspective “only for those already on the way out of
poverty.”66 In addition, clear and strong property rights may not be
appropriate because cultural norms embedded in pre-existing infor-
mal institutions are not complementary to formalization. Some have
suggested in response that the formal system should be more cogni-
zant and supportive of the informal sector and its cultural norms,
which “have widespread legitimacy” rather than replace the latter
with the former.67 Approaches based on Western property regimes
ignore this cultural context and “can lead to distortions that impact
negatively on the poor . . . .”68 “The entire legal and social complex
around which notions of formal and informal property are consti-
tuted needs to be interrogated.”69
In other circumstances and contexts, however, it may be the case
that after examining the informal property system and the cultural
institutions that support it, law and development may indeed con-
clude that the norms of the informal system are at odds with the le-
gitimate objectives of the law and development project and should
instead be challenged. What are the objectives of law and develop-
ment, one would then ask. Development viewed exclusively in terms
of economic growth is passé and in recent years, development has
been viewed more broadly. American governmental officials at the
top echelon, such as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, increasingly
understand that “development, democracy, and human rights can
and must be mutually reinforcing.”70 Indeed it is now generally ac-
cepted in many circles that there is a positive linkage between de-
velopment and human rights71 and that development should be
66. Id. at 5.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks to the Center for Global Develop-
ment, Washington D.C. (Jan. 6, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01
/134838.htm. (“So those who care about making human rights a reality know that develop-
ment is an integral part of that agenda.”).
71. Ana Palacio, The Way Forward: Human Rights and the World Bank, in WORLD BANK
DEVELOPMENT OUTREACH 35 (Oct. 2006), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL
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understood within a broader framework of political and social institu-
tions that promote basic rights.72 This broad view of development has
been endorsed by scholars as well. Amartya Sen, the noted Nobel lau-
reate in economics, has argued eloquently in favor of a holistic vision
for development.73 For Sen, development means freedom and maxi-
mizing well-being, taken broadly to mean maximizing capabilities—
to participate freely in the political process, to satisfy hunger, to
have access to social networks and connections, reliable information
sources and structures.74 The anthropologist Arjun Appadurai calls
/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/0,,contentMDK:21106614~menuPK:445673~pagePK:64020865
~piPK:149114~theSitePK:445634,00.html. Indeed, more and more, it is understood that de-
velopment is intertwined with broader objectives such as human rights promotion. “The world
now accepts that sustainable development is impossible without human rights. What has been
missing is the recognition that the advancement of an interconnected set of human rights is im-
possible without development.” INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
(IBRD), DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK 2 (1998), available
at http://www.fao.org/righttofood/KC/downloads/vl/docs/HR%20and%20devlopment_the%20role
%20of%20the%20WB.pdf. See also Gernot Brodnig, The World Bank and Human Rights:
Mission Impossible? 9 (Carr Ctr. for Human Rights Policy, Working Paper T-01-05), available
at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/BrodnigHR&WorldBank
.pdf (arguing in favor of integrating human rights objectives with the objectives of the World
Bank because “development represents a bundle of interlocking concepts of very broad envi-
ronmental, socioeconomic, legal and institutional implications, including the protection and
promotion of human rights.”). Research has also shown that countries with substantial po-
litical and civil rights violations are also characterized by lower levels of economic growth.
ROBERT BARRO, DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A CROSS-COUNTRY EMPIRICAL STUDY
(1997); Robert Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, 106 Q. J. ECON. 407.
Studies have also shown a strong empirical link between civil liberties and performance of
government projects. Jonathan Isham et al., Civil Liberties, Democracy and the Performance
of Government Projects, 11 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 219 (1997).
72. See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999) [hereinafter SEN,
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM].
73. Id. See also AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT (1992).
74. To quote Sen directly, there are five distinct types of freedom:
These include (1) political freedoms, (2) economic facilities, (3) social oppor-
tunities, (4) transparency guarantees and (5) protective security. Each of these
distinct types of rights and opportunities helps to advance the general capability
of a person. They may also serve to complement each other. Public policy to fos-
ter human capabilities and substantive freedoms in general can work through
the promotion of these distinct but interrelated instrumental freedoms . . . . In
the view of “development as freedom,” the instrumental freedoms link with each
other and with the ends of enhancement of human freedom in general.
While development analysis must, on the one hand, be concerned with ob-
jectives and aims that make these instrumental freedoms consequentially im-
portant, it must also take note of the empirical linkages that tie the distinct
types of freedom together, strengthening their joint importance.
SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 72, at 10.
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this capacity “voice.” For Appadurai, alleviating poverty means work-
ing to strengthen the capacity of the poor to exercise their voice,75
not only because this capacity is tied to democratic principles of in-
clusion and participation but also because “[i]t is the only way in
which the poor might find locally plausible ways to alter . . . the
terms of recognition in any particular cultural regime.”76
Thus, a cultural regime that subverts the legitimate property
rights of the poor or the marginalized in any given community must
be examined and evaluated. Notably, efforts to reform inheritance
and land rights concerning women in sub-Saharan Africa have been
subverted by informal institutions and traditional cultural norms
that have the effect of systematically constricting the rights and
voice of African women. For many in sub-Saharan Africa, issues
such as marriage, divorce, burial, and inheritance rights continue
to be governed by customary law.77 As noted, “[a]lthough conceptu-
ally distinct from culture, customary law is a legal expression of
cultural norms and values.”78 Many African states have retained a
legal structure wherein the customary law of inheritance, which gen-
erally excludes women as potential heirs, and statutory law operate
simultaneously.79 Driven by traditional notions of culture and gen-
der relationships, customary law has excluded women from property
ownership and inheritance.80 A woman’s relationship to land has
traditionally been defined through her relationship to her father or
75. See also Arjun Appadurai, The Capacity to Aspire: Culture and the Terms of
Recognition, in CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION 63, 66 (Vijayendra Rao & Michael Walton eds.,
2004). Using Hirschman’s framework laid out in his groundbreaking book, ALBERT O.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS,
AND STATES (1970), Appadurai argued that it is especially important in law and development
to focus on increasing the capacity of the poor to have their voice heard. Exit is not an option
for the world’s poor and loyalty is not clear-cut, leaving voice as the only viable and potentially
powerful tool to alleviate poverty.
76. Appadurai, supra note 75, at 63, 66.
77. Johanna Bond, Gender, Discourse, and Customary Law in Africa, 83 S. CAL. L. REV.
425, 430 (2010).
78. Id. at 430; Thandabantu Nhlapo, Indigenous Law and Gender in South Africa: Taking
Human Rights and Cultural Diversity Seriously, 13 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 49, 53 (1994)
(“Sometimes termed customary law, indigenous law is the system of norms which governs the
lives of millions of African people, particularly (but not exclusively) in the rural areas.”).
79. Bond, supra note 77, at 430, 434.
80. Abby Morrow Richardson, Women’s Inheritance Rights in Africa: The Need to Integrate
Cultural Understanding and Legal Reform, 11 HUM. RTS. BR. 19, 19 (2004).
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husband.81 While married, a woman gains access to use of the land,
however, following the death of a husband, the woman no longer
holds any rights in the land.82 The practice of “property-grabbing”
has recently developed, wherein following the death of a father or
husband, family members and elites repossess the male’s property
often leaving widows and orphans homeless and destitute.83
Where statute has been at odds with customary law, the latter
has generally prevailed when the underlying issue involves gender
relations. The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, for example, refused to
interfere with tribal customary law when the tribe of the deceased
man refused to appoint his eldest daughter as heir to the estate be-
cause the man is also survived by a son. The Court rejected the daugh-
ter’s allegation that tribal law constituted a prima facie violation of
the Zimbabwean Constitution’s guarantee of equality for women,
holding instead that the Constitution exempts customary law.84
In these instances, it would be appropriate for law and develop-
ment to call for the enforcement of property rights for women even
if such enforcement conflicts with existing cultural norms. Clear and
strong property rights that are available to men should be equally
available to women. However, for these rights to be meaningful on the
ground and not just on the books, culture might need to be engaged
more robustly and even challenged. Therefore, the case for strong and
clear property rights cannot occur only at the statutory level. Given
“the persistence of traditions and cultural norms that give preference
to men,”85and that seek to preserve “religion and culture as spheres
of despotism,”86 experts in this area have suggested “‘massive aware-
ness campaigns’ at both the national and local levels.”87 Yet, unless
cultural norms are confronted and altered, through deliberate edu-
cation campaigns88 “[t]hese statutory changes generally have no
practical effect on the great majority of the population.”89
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L. J. 1399, 1431 (2003).
85. Valerie A. Dormady, Status of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1998, 33 INT’L LAW. 637, 641 (Summer 1999).
86. Sunder, supra note 84, at 1434.
87. Dormady, supra note 85, at 640.
88. Richardson, supra note 80, at 22.
89. Id. at 19.
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CONCLUSION
Strong and clear property rights have always been an objective
of law and development but the call for such rights has markedly
increased with the popularity of de Soto’s titling program and the
publication of Mystery of Capital. I have argued in this paper that
clear and strong property rights can only be part of a complex devel-
opment picture because clarity and strength obscure and sidestep
certain other considerations—specifically how formal as well as
informal institutions influence or modify a property rights regime.
Moreover, I have argued in support of greater scholarly attention
to informal institutional norms, such as culture, especially for a
discipline such as law and development for several reasons. This is
because law and development has been marred by failures and dis-
illusionment. Indeed, for years scholars and practitioners in the field
have bemoaned its decline and flaws.90 It is time to shake up the field
and adopt a different approach towards achieving development ob-
jectives by going beyond the call for the establishment of clear and
formal rights. Indeed, precisely because law and development has
had an almost exclusive focus on formal institutions, it is all the
more important that the latter approach be supplemented by a sys-
tematic examination of informal institutions and their impact on
formal rights.
90. John H. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style,
Decline and Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457 (1977); LAW
AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD (Sammy Adelman & Abdul Paliwala eds., 1993); David Trubek
& Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and
Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062 (1974).
